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criminations,	 angst,	 and	 even	 cost	 of	 dressing	 professionally—espe-
cially	for	those	whose	appearance	is	gendered	female	or	nonbinary—to	
argue	 for	 the	adoption	of	robes	 in	 the	 legal	and	 teaching	professions.		
But,	even	if	this	were	possible,	it	is	not	a	tenable	solution.		Section	I	of	
this	 Article	 considers	 the	 cult	 of	 the	 judicial	 robe,	 examining	 judicial	
views	 on	 the	 metonymy	 of	 judges	 and	 their	 attire,	 as	 well	 as	 First	







































remained.	 	Writing	 in	 1945	while	 he	was	 a	 respected	 Second	 Circuit	







damental	 democratic	 principle”	 disfavoring	 secrecy.”9	 In	 calling	 for	









one	 that	 does	 not	 generally	 communicate	 rank—conveys	 an	 institu-
tional	message	that	each	judge	“belongs	to	the	judiciary.”11	


































Fifth	 Circuit	 partially	 expunged	 the	 censure	 of	 a	 Texas	 judge	 by	 the	
state’s	commission	on	judicial	ethics	“to	the	extent	it	reached	beyond”	
the	judge’s	“use	of	the	courtroom	and	his	robe	to	send	his	message.”14	










































ruled	 that	 the	content	of	 the	statements	could	not	be	constitutionally	
censured.		The	Fifth	Circuit	emphasized	that	the	judge	was	publicly	ad-













sartorial	 splendor,”	 he	 said	 he	 “did	 not	 wish	 to	 be	 upstaged	 by	 the	
women.”27	Ginsburg	added	that	Justice	O’Connor,	the	first	woman	Su-





























cided	 not	 to	 impose	 this	 obligation	 on	 advocates	 appearing	 before	
them.”30	The	Supreme	Court	directed	that	“provided	that	all	the	advo-
cates	in	any	particular	case	agree,	they	may	communicate	to	the	Regis-
trar	 their	wish	 to	dispense	with	part	or	 all	 of	 court	dress,”	 the	Court	
would	“normally	agree”	to	the	advocates’	preference	with	regard	to	le-
gal	dress.31	Advocates’	preferences,	however,	might	well	be	to	don	the	
traditional	garb	 that	has	 long	symbolized	status,	 as	well	 as	 its	grada-





While	rationales	 for	maintaining	 formal	court	dress	 include	hierar-
chy,	as	well	as	tradition,	status	quo,	and	“branding,”	another	benefit	is	
perceived	 gender	 equality.33	 A	 somewhat	 curmudgeonly	 call	 for	 the	
adoption	of	robed	(if	not	wigged)	attorneys	in	the	United	States,	pointed	
to	problems	with	women’s	apparel:	





































by	 local	 rule	 that	 female	 attorneys	must	wear	 dresses	 or	 suits	 (with	




the	 survey	of	 232	 federal	 judges	 revealed	only	 a	 small	 percentage	of	
	





































sentially	 invoked	 the	 judges’	 common	 sense.45	 Moreover,	 the	 trial	





















necktie	 (and	 jacket)	 for	male	 attorneys,	 the	Supreme	Court	of	Alaska	
reasoned	 that	 court	 orders	 requiring	 “appropriate	 conservative	 busi-
ness	dress”	applied	equally	to	men	and	women:	“Though	women	need	
not	be	required	to	wear	a	coat	and	tie,	they	are	required	to	wear	con-

























































































































superior	 including	 removing	 one’s	 hat	 in	 court.68	 The	 refusal	 of	 hat	
honor,	intended	to	challenge	hierarchy,	had	become	a	well-known	char-
acteristic	 of	 the	Quakers;	 a	 fair	 number	of	Quakers	had	been	beaten,	
jailed,	whipped,	or	fined	because	of	their	practice	by	the	time	of	the	Penn	
and	Mead	trial.69	Thus,	this	colloquy	was	not	surprising:	
	 	 	 	RECORDER.		Do	you	know	where	you	are?		
	 	 	 	PENN.		Yes.		
	 	 	 RECORDER.		Do	you	know	it	is	the	King’s	Court?		
	 	 	 PENN.	 	 I	know	it	to	be	a	Court,	and	I	suppose	it	to	be	the	King’s	
Court.		
	 	 	 RECORDER.		Do	you	not	know	there	is	respect	due	to	the	Court?		
	 	 	 PENN.		Yes.		
	 	 	 	RECORDER.		Why	do	you	not	pay	it	then?		
	 	 	 PENN.		I	do	so.		
	 	 	 RECORDER.		Why	do	you	not	put	off	your	hat	then?	
	 	 	 PENN.		Because	I	do	not	believe	that	to	be	any	respect.	








Importance	 of	 a	 Hat,	 Paper	 CXVIII,	 (Chicago:	 Chicago	 Literary	 Club,	 1999/2001),	 available	 at:	
http://www.chilit.org/PublishedPapers.htm;	 Andrew	 Murphy,	 The	 Trial	 Transcript	 as	 Political	














However,	 shortly	 before	 this	 interchange,	 Penn	 and	 Mead	 had	 been	
waiting,	hatless,	 for	 their	case	to	be	called.71	When	an	official	noticed	
their	hats	were	off,	he	ordered	an	officer	to	“put	on	their	hats	again.”72	








	 	 	 MEAD.	I	have	a	question	to	ask	the	Recorder:	am	I	fined	also?	
	 	 	 RECORDER.	Yes.	










likely	 to	be	 accepted	by	 those	 familiar	with	 the	Penn	and	Mead	 trial.		


































































Penn	and	Mead	 trial	 three	 centuries	earlier.	 	The	Chicago	Conspiracy	
Trial	also	arose	from	actions	involving	a	tumultuous	assembly;	the	orig-
inal	Chicago	Eight	defendants	were	charged	under	the	then-recent	fed-











	 	 	 	THE	COURT:	May	the	record	show	defendants	Hoffman	and	Rubin	
came	in	at	1:28,	with	their-	
	 	 	 	MR.	RUBIN:	The	marshal	just	came	and	asked	us	to	come	in.	We	
came	as	soon	as	we	were	asked.	
	 	 	 	THE	COURT:	And	also	attired	in	what	might	be	called	collegiate	
robes.	
	 	 	 MR.	RUBIN:	Judge’s	robes,	sir.	
	 	 	 	A	DEFENDANT:	Death	robes.	
	 	 	 	THE	COURT:	Some	might	even	consider	them	judicial	robes.		
	 	 	 	MR.	RUBIN:	Judicial	robes.	
	 	 	 	THE	COURT:	Your	idea,	Mr.	Kunstler?	Another	one	of	your	brilliant	
	













	 	 	 	MR.	KUNSTLER:	Your	Honor,	I	can’t	take	credit	for	this	one.		
	 	 	 	THE	COURT:	That	amazes	me.87			
Federal	 judge	 Julius	Hoffman	 issued	criminal	contempt	citations	 for	a	
multitude	of	infractions	by	the	defendants,	as	well	as	their	attorneys.88	






After	 the	 Seventh	 Circuit	 remanded	 the	 cases	 to	 be	 tried	 before	 a	
judge	other	than	the	judge	who	had	issued	the	criminal	contempt	cita-
tions,	 Judge	Edward	Gignoux	of	Maine,	 sitting	by	 special	 designation,	



















































































Writing	separately,	 Justice	Douglas	made	explicit	 the	connection	 to	














tire	 in	 the	 context	 of	 criminal	 trials	 and	did	not	 involve	 the	manifest	

























Fifth	 and	 Fourteenth	 Amendments,	 although	 it	 could	 be	 said	 to	 flow	
from	the	Sixth	Amendment	as	a	whole	or	 the	provisions	relating	 to	a	






















































































a	 federal	 statute	 limiting	 habeas	 corpus	 relief	 to	 constitutional	 viola-
tions	 that	were	 contrary	 to	 clearly	 established	Supreme	Court	prece-
dent.124	While	the	opinion	was	unanimous,	Justice	Souter’s	concurring	




wearing	 of	 “obtrusive	 corsages	 of	 red	 and	 black	 ribbons	 of	 approxi-
mately	five	to	six	inches	in	length.”126	Applying	the	local	courtroom	de-
corum	rules	prohibiting	disruptive	conduct,	the	trial	judge	used	his	dis-
cretionary	 power	 to	 prohibit	 all	 expressive	 or	 symbolic	 clothing	 and	
accessories,	including	armbands,	buttons,	and	flowers,	as	“disruptive	of	
a	 courtroom	 environment,	 which	 environment	must	 be	 scrupulously	













































What	 if	 the	button-wearer	 is	not	 a	 spectator,	 but	 a	 state	 employee	
who	would	presumably	possess	First	Amendment	rights?	 	Under	Gar-
cetti	v.	Ceballos,	the	state	employee	might	have	limited	rights	during	the	

























The	 state	 habeas	 court,	 however,	 conducted	 an	 evidentiary	
hearing	but	did	not	find	sufficient	evidence	to	conclude	that	the	
jury	saw	the	tie.	I	therefore	do	not	disagree	with	the	denial	of	





[citing	 Illinois	 v.	Allen].	The	stakes—life	 in	 this	 case,	 liberty	 in	
many	others—are	too	high	to	allow	anything	less.134	
The	United	States	Supreme	Court	bans	expressive	dress	at	the	United	




organization,	 or	 movement”	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 building	 or	
grounds.136	In	1983	in	United	States	v.	Grace,	the	Court	held	that	the	pro-
hibition	could	not	constitutionally	extend	to	the	sidewalk,	a	traditional	
public	 forum.137	 Justice	Thurgood	Marshall	 contended	 that	 the	entire	





“devices	 that	 bring	 into	 public	 notice	 a	 party,	 organization,	 or	move-
ment”	make	clear	that	they	extend	to	clothes.		For	example,	a	D.C.	appel-































that	 mandates	 a	 tie	 can	 constitutionally	 be	 applied	 to	 public	 school	
teachers,	courts	have	often	acknowledged	the	government’s	interests	in	

















































was	 required	 to	wear	a	 tie,	 and	 the	 “alternative”	 class	 in	 filmmaking,	
when	he	was	not.149	During	an	era	when	school	busing	cases	dominated	
other	circuits,	the	Second	Circuit	en	banc	stated	that	“it	is	not	the	federal	
courts,	but	 local	democratic	processes,	 that	are	primarily	 responsible	



















Compared	 to	mandatory	 tie	 requirements,	 regulations	 of	 teachers’	















ulation	 jurisprudence	 in	 1982,	 the	 Fifth	 Circuit	 stated	 that	 there	 is	 a	
“bright	line”	between	public	colleges	and	public	secondary	or	elemen-
tary	 schools.154	 The	 asserted	 needs	 for	 professionalism,	 respect,	 and	
discipline	are	simply	not	sufficient	at	the	college	level.155	Interestingly,	





















school	 graduation,	 a	 ceremony	 during	 which	 they	 traditionally	 wear	
robe-like	attire.		As	one	federal	judge	described	it,	the	cap	and	gown	is	




judge	 found	 that	 the	 student’s	 expressive	 activity	 must	 yield	 to	 the	
school	 board’s	 interests,	 including	 an	 interest	 in	 “demonstrating	 the	
unity	of	the	class	and	celebrating	academic	achievement.”159	The	judge	
noted	that	“not	all	of	the	audience	members	will	be	Lakota	or	will	un-






institution	 of	 learning	 and	 the	 teachers’	 and	 administrators’	 achieve-
ments	as	educators.”162		
Thus,	 the	 judge	presiding	over	 the	hearing	on	Dreaming	Bear’s	 re-
quest	for	preliminary	relief,	presumably	attired	in	his	own	black	judicial	























be	 able	 to	move	 forward	with	more	 understanding	 of	 balancing	 our	
roles	and	our	humanity.	
	
